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On 20 November 2019, Lassa fever was diagnosed 
in a physician repatriated from Sierra Leone to the 
Netherlands. A second physician with suspected 
Lassa fever, repatriated a few days later from the 
same healthcare facility, was confirmed infected with 
Lassa virus on 21 November. Comprehensive con-
tact monitoring involving high- and low-risk contacts 
proved to be feasible and follow-up of the contacts did 
not reveal any case of secondary transmission in the 
Netherlands.
Two patients with Lassa haemorrhagic fever were diag-
nosed following nosocomial exposure in a hospital in 
the district Tonkolili in Sierra Leone. We aimed to recon-
struct the measures undertaken regarding the patients 
and their contacts, identify the lessons learned and 
formulate recommendations for future cases of impor-
tation of patients with haemorrhagic fever.
Epidemiological description of the case 
patients
Both cases – Case 1 (C1) and Case 2 (C2) - had been 
working in a rural hospital in the Tonkolili district in 
Sierra Leone. On 4 November 2019, two Dutch health-
care workers (C1 and C2) and one local (C3) participated 
in obstetric surgical procedures in two local patients 
who were later presumed to be the source of Lassa 
virus (LASV) infection. One patient died on the day of 
surgery after resuscitation during which C1 was not 
wearing optimal personal protective equipment (PPE). 
The other patient died 2 weeks later. Haemorrhage was 
reported in both patients.
On 11 November, while attending an international 
course in Freetown, C1 started to develop non-spe-
cific symptoms (headache, muscle ache, arthralgia, 
fever, diarrhoea, vomiting and cough). C1 was treated 
locally for the most probable tropical diseases (such as 
malaria and typhoid fever).
After 8 days of persisting symptoms, C1 was medi-
cally evacuated to the Netherlands on 19 November 
on a commercially run private plane with a German 
flight crew, with a transit in Morocco. No specific infec-
tion precautions were taken on the flight. C1 was ini-
tially transferred by ambulance (Ambulance 1) to the 
Amsterdam University Medical Center (location AMC, 
Hospital 1), also without specific infection precautions. 
Staff in the hospital used MRSA (meticillin-resist-
ant  Staphylococcus aureus) airborne strict isolation 
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measures and PPE (gloves, FFP2 masks and gowns). 
Upon suspicion of Lassa fever, C1 was relocated in a 
dedicated ambulance (Ambulance 2) to the Leiden 
University Medical Center (LUMC, Hospital 2) dedi-
cated facility for treatment of highly contagious infec-
tions. The diagnosis of Lassa fever was confirmed on 
20 November by RT-PCR and genome sequencing per-
formed at Erasmus Medical Center (EMC) in Rotterdam. 
After rapid clinical deterioration, the patient died on 23 
November. Stringent hygienic precautions were taken 
for management of the corpse.
C2 also started to develop non-specific symptoms 
(fever, vomiting and anorexia) on 11 November and was 
unsuccessfully treated in Sierra Leone for the most 
probable tropical diseases. RT-PCR on plasma samples 
of C2, sent to the EMC, tested positive for LASV on 21 
November at and the decision was made for medical 
evacuation to the Netherlands. In a clinically stable 
condition, C2 was airlifted on 23 November under strict 
isolation measures by a French flight crew of Airlec 
Medical. C2 was transported in a dedicated ambulance 
(Ambulance 3) to the Major Incident Hospital at the 
University Medical Centre Utrecht (UMCU, Hospital 3), 
and admitted to a facility for highly contagious infec-
tions. C2 was discharged on 12 December, after two 
negative results within an interval of 48 h in serum 
tests for presence of LASV RNA. The patient was dis-
charged into home isolation; as LASV RNA remained 
positive in the urine, strict instructions regarding 
hygiene were enforced until urine tested negative after 
12 days.
C3 was a local healthcare worker who was confirmed 
with Lassa fever infection by the authorities in Sierra 
Leone. The case history and contact tracing around this 
case are not part of this report.
Contact tracing
Contact tracing was initiated upon confirmation of 
the diagnosis in C1 as viral haemorrhagic fevers are 
mandatorily notifiable according to Dutch law [1]. 
Immediately, a response team convened at the Centre 
for Communicable Diseases (CIb), consisting of rep-
resentatives of the hospitals, the reference labora-
tory (EMC), involved public health services (PHS 1–5), 
ambulance services and experts from the CIb. The 
response team provided scientific advice on the risk 
assessment, risk classification and control measures 
regarding contacts and coordinated the risk communi-
cation [2,3].
The contacts of C1 and C2 (including all transporta-
tion and hospital staff) were interviewed to assess the 
intensity of exposure to the cases. All Dutch healthcare 
workers repatriated from Sierra Leone and the ones who 
were contacts of the presumed source patients were 
listed. Contacts were classified into three risk groups 
according to the nature of their exposure (Table). The 
control measures were targeted to each risk level, a 
procedure validated in a previous case [4,5].
Contact monitoring
In total, 164 contacts who (temporarily) resided in the 
Netherlands were identified for follow-up. Nineteen 
were classified as high-risk contacts [6] (Figure). 
Monitoring of high- and low-risk contacts, respec-
tively, ended on 15 December and 2 January 2020, 21 
days after the last exposure (Table). Post-exposure 
prophylaxis (PEP) was not prescribed to contacts in 
Table
Dutch risk classification of contacts exposed to healthcare workers with RT-PCR-confirmed Lassa fever contracted in Sierra 
Leone, including numbers of contacts inventoried in the Netherlands, December 2019
Type of contact Risk Mandatory measures until 21 days post exposure




Contact with patient or body fluids 
without appropriate PPE
- Temperature check 2×/day 
 
- Daily contact with public health 
service or hospital staff 
 
- Prohibition to travel abroad 
 
- Work restrictions 
 
- Safe sex (condom use)
19 
 
(Hospital 1, Ambulance 1, friends 
SL, colleagues SL, family)
Low-risk 
contactsa,b
Contact with patient or body fluids 
with use of appropriate PPE Temperature check 2×/day
131 
 




Presence in same room without 




PPE: personal protective equipment, SL: Sierra Leone.
a In case of fever ≥ 38 °C measured twice,12 h apart, contacts are instructed to consult their assigned healthcare worker (municipal health 
service or hospital staff) and to avoid new contacts.
b Including contacts without direct contact, but who have been working in and around the hospital in Sierra Leone.
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the Netherlands. Two contacts (one high- and one 
low-risk) developed a fever, but an acute LASV infec-
tion was excluded in EDTA-plasma with RT-PCR. All 
high-risk contacts were considered as non-infected as 
paired serum samples taken at the beginning and at 
the end of the tracing of high risk contacts revealed no 
seroconversion for LASV-specific IgM and IgG by both 
immunofluorescence assay and ELISA (Bernhard Nocht 
Institute, Hamburg, Germany).
Large grey spheres: assumed source patients with 
Lassa fever in the local hospital, Sierra Leone. Large 
white spheres: confirmed secondary cases (C1, C2 
and another healthcare worker (C3) involved in the 
surgical procedures of the assumed source patients). 
Small spheres: contacts. Red line: high-risk contact, 
blue line: low-risk contact, no line: contact without 
direct contact, but followed up as low-risk as they 
have been working in and around the hospital in Sierra 
Leone. Red outer line of sphere: contact returned from 
Sierra Leone, black outer line of sphere: contact in the 
Netherlands.
Dutch hospitals involved: AUMC location AMC (Hosp 
1), LUMC (Hosp 2), UMCU (Hosp 3) and EMC (Hosp 4). 
Dutch Public Health Services involved: Public Health 
Service Hollands Midden (PHS 1), Amsterdam (PHS 2), 
Rotterdam-Rijnmond (PHS 3), Kennemerland (PHS 4), 
and region Utrecht (PHS 5).
The figure displays the confirmed cases (C1, C2, C3), 
the presumed source patients and those contacts that 
were followed up in the Netherlands. The figure does 
therefore not display: the 14 sporadic cases identi-
fied in the Netherlands, the high- and low-risk con-
tacts identified elsewhere in the European Union, the 
German and French flight crews, the local and Dutch 
contacts of C1 and C2 who resided in Sierra Leone and 
the local contacts and secondary cases of the pre-
sumed source patients who resided in Sierra Leone.
Figure 
Contact tree representing the high- and low-risk contacts in the Netherlands of the assumed source patients in Sierra Leone 
and of two Dutch healthcare workers diagnosed with confirmed Lassa fever, the Netherlands, December 2019 (n = 150)
Hosp: hospital; PHS: Public Health Service.
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Dedicated air transportation was arranged for five 
Dutch high-risk contacts and British contacts who still 
resided in Sierra Leone. Other contacts in Europe were 
identified, according to the stepwise backwards con-
tact tracing starting with the air ambulance, in Germany 
(n = 5), the United Kingdom (UK) (n = 18), Denmark 
(n = 5) and Norway (n = 2).These contacts have been 
followed up by the corresponding national authorities, 
but further spread has not been reported.
Communication with a representative of the hospi-
tal in Sierra Leone was established and criteria were 
exchanged for the identification and monitoring of per-
sons who had potentially been exposed locally. As the 
contact investigation had revealed contacts from other 
countries, authorities in Germany, the UK, Denmark and 
Norway were informed between 20 and 27 November 
using the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) 
of the European Union (EU). On 20 November, an offi-
cial notification was issued through the EWRS and the 
World Health Organization Event Information Site. The 
International Health Regulations National Focal Points 
of Sierra Leone and Morocco were officially informed 
by the Dutch authorities.
Discussion
Lassa virus is a single-stranded RNA virus belonging to 
the family  Arenaviridae. It is endemic in several West 
African countries, in particular Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Guinea and Nigeria, although cases had been reported 
only sporadically in the Tonkolili region [7,8]. Rodents 
act as a reservoir and shed the virus in urine and drop-
pings. Humans become infected through contact with 
contaminated rodent excreta, e.g. via objects or inha-
lation of aerosols. Human-to-human transmission is 
primarily nosocomial through patients’ body fluids or 
contaminated fomites when PPE is not in place [5].
Lassa virus causes an estimated 300,000 infections 
per year worldwide with, in 80% of the cases, no or 
very mild symptoms and, in 20% of cases, severe dis-
ease (haemorrhages and multi-organ failure) [6,9]. 
The case fatality is 15–20% in hospitalised cases [10]. 
There is no evidence of human-to-human transmission 
from asymptomatic carriers, but well-designed studies 
to address this question are lacking [9,11].
This report shows that LASV can pose an infection risk 
during routine invasive hospital procedures involving 
patients in endemic areas, in particular on maternity 
wards as LASV has a high affinity for placenta and 
vascular tissues [7,12]. Awareness of the local risks 
and implementation of standard precautions to reduce 
the risk of transmission of blood-borne pathogens are 
essential to prevent nosocomial transmission [8,13]. As 
LASV infection is initially difficult to diagnose clinically, 
rapid and accurate differential laboratory diagnostics 
are crucial to initiate appropriate supporting care and 
to set up measures to prevent human-to-human trans-
mission [9,10].
PEP with ribavirin was not advised for contacts in the 
Netherlands because the evidence on effectiveness is 
inconclusive while potential side effects can be severe 
[14,15]. Favipiravir and experimental monoclonal anti-
bodies (which have shown encouraging results in ani-
mal models) were procured, to be used upon clinical 
indication [16].
The psychosocial burden of the death of the Dutch 
healthcare worker and of the measures on the patients, 
contacts and their families was reported as considera-
ble. Protocols are required that adequately balance the 
necessary containment measures and the psychosocial 
burden on patients, contacts and care providers [10].
The response teams in the involved countries in the EU 
and European Economic Area appeared to use differ-
ent Lassa fever protocols regarding PEP and testing of 
asymptomatic contacts (personal communication, UK 
EWRS team, 23 November 2019). There is a clear need 
for evidence-based practices implemented in standard-
ised policies across countries.
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